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Abstract— Security can mean different things in a different
application context. For decades, gaming has been a major
computer application with its own distinct characteristics, and in
fact, online gaming is now one of the most popular applications
on the Internet. However, there are few systematic treatments
of security concerns in gaming. In this paper, we briefly trace
the history of computer games. Then, we examine the role that
security has played in different games, from early mainframe-
based games through arcade, PC and console games to the latest
online games.
Online cheating is widely considered a new security concern in
computer games. However, it is not as well understood by security
experts as one might expect. In this paper, we systematically
investigate cheating in online games. We identify common forms
of cheating as they have occurred or might occur in online games,
and then we define a taxonomy of online game cheating with
respect to the underlying cause (namely what is exploited?),
consequence (what type of security failure can be achieved?)
and the cheating principal (who can cheat?). One of our findings
is that the four traditional aspects of security – confidentiality,
integrity, availability and authenticity – are insufficient to explain
cheating and its consequences in online games, and fairness can
be a vital additional aspect.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer games may initially appear to be merely source of
entertainment for the younger generations in society. However,
more than fun, they have been for decades one of the major
computer applications, one with far reaching implications.
Few people might realise that computer games have been a
driving force in the development of the IT industry, though
they might understand that economies of scale can play a
major role in the diffusion of a technology into a society.
In the 1970s and early 1980s, the game business consumed
so much silicon that it was a major funding resource for the
semiconductor industry. The huge volume of memory chips
and monitors consumed by early games also made it possible
for manufacturers to produce them at much lower prices. All
this contributed to make early personal computers considerably
cheaper and thus more acceptable [3].
Nowadays, gaming still leads the development of consumer
graphics hardware and software [27], and the computer game
industry occupies a multi-billion dollar market. In 2001, the
U.S. computer game market generated $9.4 billion in sales,
outperforming for the first time U.S. film box office sales,
which totalled $8.35 billion [30].
Computer games have also become a part of popular culture
and have changed many people’s life styles. People growing
up in the 1960’s have been often referred to as “the Beatles
Generation” because of the huge influence that the Beatles
and their music had upon them. Now many authors use “the
Nintendo Generation” to refer to those who grew up while
playing Nintendo games. On the other hand, just as the US
has world-widely exported its culture through its movie and
television programs, many oriental cultural concepts, with the
rise of Nintendo and the Japanization of the game business
that occurred in the late 1980s, have quickly entered into the
world culture through games [3]. For example, the oriental
legend of the Ninja Turtles is now common knowledge in
many countries.
For decades, gaming has been a major computer application
with its own distinct characteristics such as high quality
graphics and strong emphases on playability. In fact, online
gaming is now one of the most popular applications on the
Internet [17]. It is well known that security can mean different
things in a different application context. However, there are
few systematic treatments of security concerns in such a
representative application as gaming. In this paper, we examine
the role that security has played in different computer games,
from early mainframe-based games through arcade, PC and
console games to the latest online games.
We first briefly trace the history of computer games in
Section II. Section III is an overview of security concerns
in various computer games. In Section IV, we systematically
examine cheating in online games, which is widely considered
to be a new security concern in computer games but not as well
understood by security experts as one might expect. We iden-
tify common forms of cheating as they have occurred or might
occur in online games. Then, we define a taxonomy of online
game cheating with respect to the underlying cause (namely
what is exploited?), consequence (what type of security failure
can be achieved?) and the cheating principal (who can cheat?).
We also present some results deduced from our taxonomy.
Finally, Section V provides some summary conclusions.
II. COMPUTER GAMES: A BRIEF HISTORY
Though there were earlier faked game-playing automata, the
first ideas concerning how a game would truly be automated
can be traced back to 1864, when Charles Babbage conceived
how an automaton might play the game of chess. The common
association of modern digital computers and games, in some
sense, began in the 1940’s when John von Neumann and Oskar
Morgenstern studied the general theory of games and showed
how their minimax algorithm theoretically applied to chess.
The earliest research into modern computer games was
mainly concerned with computer intelligence and as a means
for humans to understand their own intelligence. For the
purpose of these areas of research, computer chess served as an
excellent field of study. Many prominent scientists pioneered
research into computer chess. For example, Claude Shannon
2published his fundamental paper [28] on computer chess in
1950, and Alan Turing proposed an approach to automating
chess strategy [31] in 1953. Shannon’s work proposed basic
strategies for restricting the number of possibilities to be
considered in a game, and outlined how computer chess would
have to evaluate and choose future positions. Although he
never wrote chess-playing software, almost all major chess
programs that have ever been written were based on Shannon’s
ideas.
A. Early Mainframe Games
According to [19], the first computer game to materialise
was a military simulation game developed by Bob Chapman
et. al. at the Rand Air Defence Lab in USA during 1952,
and the first non-military game to use a video display was
probably a crude game of pool programmed at the University
of Michigan in 1954.
In 1962, Steven Russell, Martin Graetz and Peter Samson
wrote Spacewar! on a PDP-1 computer in MIT. Perhaps
because PDP-1 was the world’s first commercial interactive
computer, which had a 15-inch CRT display and supported
human-machine interaction in a way similar to current prac-
tice, Spacewar! is often cited as the first computer game in
public media or popular readings.
No doubt most of the earliest computer games were main-
frame games, which ran on mainframe computers, and were
mainly played by researchers or computer specialists.
B. Arcade Games
In 1971, a coin-operated game machine called Computer
Space was set up in the corner of a bar in Silicon Valley.
Unlike a computer, this game machine could do nothing but
play the game, Computer Space, which, developed by Nolan
Bushnell, actually was a simpler version of Steve Russell’s
Spacewar!. This was the first coin-operated arcade game with
a video display1. In 1972, Bushnell produced another arcade
game known as Pong, which, in distinction to Computer Space,
was an instant success. Computer Space and Pong began the
decades of arcade video games.
According to Nolan Bushnell [3], his Computer Space was
not a computer game, but an electronic game based on a hard-
wired state machine built from logical gates and counters.
Similarly, most of the early arcade games were not computer
games, but electronic games, since microprocessors were not
invented until 1971. It is not known when the first computer
arcade game was built, but it is believed that Nintendo started
selling coin-operated video games using microcomputers from
1978 [23].
1According to [16], the first commercial video game was Galaxy Game,
another arcade version of Spacewar!. Developed by Bill Pitts and Hugh
Tuck, it was installed in Stanford’s student union a few months before Nolan
Bushnell set up his Computer Space. Despite this disputed fact, Bushnell’s
Computer Space is still widely cited as the first such game in video game
history.
C. Console Games
Around the time Nolan Bushnell invented arcade games,
which usually could not be played at home, the console
game was invented so that people could play at home by
attaching a game console to an ordinary television set. The
first console of this kind was Odyssey, invented by Ralph
Baer and marketed by Magnavox in 1971. The game console
with replaceable cartridges was first introduced by Fairchild
Instrument and Camera in late 1976, and it was named
Channel F game system. This 8-bit system utilised an early
microchip, the F8 invented by Robert Noyce, and its use of
replaceable game cartridges offered consumers a theoretically
inexhaustible variety of games. The game giant Nintendo
made its fortune with its 8-bit NES console in the middle of
1980’s. In 1995, Sony entered this console market by releasing
its revolutionary Playstation console. Microsoft also entered
this lucrative market in 2001 with the release of its Xbox
console, a system born with huge amounts of investment.
Now, the console market is dominated by Sony’s Playstation
2, Nintendo’s GameCube and Microsoft’s Xbox.
D. PC Games
In some sense, personal computers were invented for fun
by early hackers. Games were linked to the early personal
computers in many ways. The first generation personal com-
puter games were written for computers such as TRS-80 and
Apple I in 1976. On the other hand, the arcade version of
Breakout, a game machine designed by Steven Wozniak for
Atari played a significant role in his creating Apple II which
was first released in 1977 [33], [34].
Most early personal computer games were written for Apple
II. But once IBM PCs and its compatibles dominated the
personal computer market, they also became the dominating
platform most games were targeted on. Consequently, people
started to label games running on personal computers as PC
games.
Although Linux has been increasingly popular as a PC
operating system, it has had little success wooing PC game
players [15]. Instead, PC games have been largely designed
for MS-DOS and MS-Windows platforms.
E. Online Games
Most computer games were for a single player only, namely
the player played with or against a virtual player simulated
by the game software. Multi-player games2 designed for
mainframe, arcade, console and PC platforms never became
a major phenomenon until the emergence of online games,
which have changed the way games are played. Online games
are computer games played by one or more persons over
the Internet, and the game device each player uses can be a
computer, a game console or even a mobile phone powered by
a microprocessor. Most online games allow many users, who
may be in different places over the world, to play together over
2If a game is “multi-player”, there are at least two alternatives: two or more
people playing on the same machine in the same room, or two or more people
playing over a network.
3the network. Players can have more fun than before because
they can compete with real human beings, and probably
with different people each time. Moreover, each online game
constitutes an exciting virtual community where people can
socialise while playing games.
The first online game was probably the MUD1 (Multi-
User Dungeon) developed by Roy Trubshaw and Richard
Bartle at Essex University in England in 1979. MUD1 was
the first adventure game to support multiple players, and it
was so influential that it has inspired lots of variations (a
comprehensive overview of major MUDs until 1990 can be
found in [1]).
Nowadays, online gaming has become one of the relatively
few profit-making e-commerce applications. Indeed it is devel-
oping into a multi-billion dollar business in its own right. The
market force behind it is that players love playing games online
with real human beings, and they are willing to pay to play.
Sony’s online game EverQuest [32] earns the company around
$5 million per month from its monthly subscription fee, and
the game’s gross-profit margin is around 40 percent [10]. Many
other online games such as Ultima Online [24], Diablo II [2]
and Korea’s Lineage [20] have also achieved huge commercial
success.
III. SECURITY CONCERNS IN COMPUTER GAMES: AN
OVERVIEW
In this section, we examine the role that security has played
in different games, from early mainframe-based games through
arcade, console and PC games to the latest console games.
A. Security in Mainframe, Arcade and PC Games
Security for computer games was simply ignored in the
early years. Although security started to become a concern
for computer scientists in the 1960’s, it was only one of the
many issues for operating system designers. There were no real
security considerations that were specific to computer games,
which were mainly mainframe games at the time.
The only plausible exception known was a unique access
control feature implemented in the Cambridge Multiple Access
System at Cambridge University in the middle 1960s. It
controlled access to data by the identity of the program that
was being used to do the access, as well as or instead of a
user identity. Examples utilising this unusual access control
feature included “the league table file that recorded people’s
relative standing in a competitive guessing game, which was
accessible to the game program only” [21].
The security of coin-operated arcade games dealt mainly
with the physical security of coin boxes locked in the arcade
game machines. People tackled this security issue simply by
using safer boxes, and putting game machines in trustworthy
or guarded places.
As with the other content-critical industries such as music or
video, when issues of content piracy expanded to threatening
levels, copy protection became important, especially for PC
games. From the beginning, PC games were especially vul-
nerable to piracy, because they have been typically shipped
on removable storage media such as floppy disks and CD-
ROMs. Many diskette or CD-ROM based copy protection
techniques have been developed for games and other software,
and they achieved only a mixed success because this is a co-
evolutionary war between guardians and crackers.
B. Security in Console Games
There were also copy protection mechanisms in console
games. However, the bulk of the security effort of console
game vendors has been directed towards locking in customers
to their hardware, and making strategic plays in the market.
Nintendo appears to be the first console vendor who adopted
security techniques for this purpose, and introduced practices
that were to define the game console industry to this day.
The first game console released by Nintendo was Famicom
(short for “Family Computer”), and it was an immediate hit in
Japan in 1983. Famicom was purposefully designed as a closed
system. Security techniques were introduced to an improved
version of Famicom before it was released in USA under the
name of NES (short for “Nintendo Entertainment System”) in
1985.
The security system that engineers in Nintendo introduced
to NES was a complex implementation of a simple lock-
and-key concept. Each authentic NES console and cartridge
contained a security chip, and these chips communicated with
each other with a shared secret key. As long as the chip in the
console and another in the cartridge were communicating, the
system operated; otherwise, the system froze up. In this way, a
NES console would reject any non-Nintendo game cartridges;
if a Nintendo cartridge was inserted into a console that didn’t
know the key, the game would not run either.
While this lock-and-key system worked to reject coun-
terfeits made for Famicom and stop NES counterfeiters, it
stopped more than that.
Nintendo protected its security system via both copyright
and patent. The company filed a patent for its lock-and-key
system3. Meanwhile, Nintendo’s code used for authentication,
known as “10NES”, was also registered at the US Copyright
Office. Only Nintendo had access to this intellectual property4.
And Nintendo periodically modified the keys inside NES
consoles so that only Nintendo-approved games could play.
Therefore, no one could manufacture their own games for the
NES platform without Nintendo’s approval.
Nintendo used this advantage to enforce strict licensee
agreements. For example, licensees had to pay expensive
3US patent No. 4,799,635, “System for determining authenticity of an
external memory used in an information processing apparatus”, filed in 1985
and granted in 1989.
4There is only one legitimate way to get access to a copyrighted code: with
an affidavit filed to indicate that a work was the subject of litigation, a copy of
the concerned work could be legally obtained from the US copyright office.
The rationale behind this was: a party being sued for violating a copyright
couldn’t defend itself unless it could review the copyrighted material [29]. This
approach can be exploited as a “litigation attack”. An infamous unsuccessful
case was attempted by Atari Games, one of the major competitors of Nintendo
at the time [29]. In early 1988, Atari Games failed to reverse engineer
Nintendo’s security system, but they managed to get a copy of 10NES from
the Copyright Office by falsely alleging that it was a present defendant in
a case with Nintendo. Atari Games was successfully sued by Nintendo for
intellectual property infringement.
4royalties. Nintendo also used this advantage to censor games.
If a game developed by a licensee received poor comments
from Nintendo, no matter how much the licensee might have
spent in its development, it would not be released on any NES
consoles. Nintendo’s security chip was referred to in the indus-
try as a “lock-out” chip. To further extend Nintendo’s control,
all cartridges for the NES console had to be manufactured
through Nintendo, though it was the licensee’s job to sell them.
All this combined to make Nintendo the number one video
game manufacturer at the time, as well as one of the most
successful companies in the world. Nintendo at its peak
grabbed a near-monopoly position in the industry, which it
retained for nearly ten years [29].
Following Nintendo’s practice, Sega, a former major player
in the console game market, also created security systems in
its consoles to guard against software pirates and unlicensed
publishers. While manufacturing its Genesis III console in
1990, Sega began to include a Trademark Security System
(TMSS), a lock-out device that operated by searching each
game cartridge inserted into the console for four bytes of
data present at a particular location in all Sega-produced game
programs. If the console failed to find the TMSS initialization
code at the necessary location, it would not allow the game to
operate.
Until now, it appears that all major console vendors still
use security techniques to make strategic plays in the market,
retaining the tradition initiated by Nintendo. Microsoft, the
newcomer, has also employed security techniques in its Xbox
to reject games developed for other platforms. Though some
of its strategic plays enforced by security techniques are as
yet still unclear, the MIT Xbox hack [9] may have revealed
some hints.
C. Security in Online Games
The emergence of online games has not only changed
the way games are played, it has also led to fundamentally
changed security requirements for computer games.
Online game vendors distribute their game software free of
charge or with a symbolic fee, and charge a user when he logs
in to play on their servers. Thus the traditional headache of
copy protection can be forgotten5.
As (distributed) Internet applications, online games concern
more complicated security issues than traditional computer
games did. For example, security for online games includes
security for game hosting systems in a networked environment,
and it covers issues such as privacy and access control. For
commercial online games, security also concerns the payment
mechanism. But these are relatively well understood issues as
they are shared by other Internet applications.
Recent research has suggested that cheating is in fact a ma-
jor new security concern for online computer games [26], [35],
[36]. A careful investigation of online cheating can benefit the
study of security in this representative Internet application.
However, cheating has not been studied as thoroughly as one
5This business model appears to provide a good solution to the long-
standing problem of software piracy.
might expect. For instance, although cheating is rampant in
online games, there is no generally accepted definition for it.
Three reasons may explain this fact. First of all, cheating
is a relatively new topic for security researchers, although
many online game players have been familiar with it for a
considerable time. Second, the variety of online games now
in existence has made cheating a complicated phenomenon.
For example, there are a number of entirely different game
genres, and each may give rise to varied forms of cheating.
Third, many novel cheats have been invented that are different
from but often entangled with ordinary security attacks.
IV. CHEATING IN ONLINE GAMES
In this section, we systematically examine cheating in online
games while adopting the following definition for it, which
refines the version used in [35].
Any behaviour that a player uses to gain an ad-
vantage or achieve a target in an online game is
cheating if, according to the game rules or at the
discretion of the game operator (i.e. the game ser-
vice provider, who is not necessarily the developer
of the game), the advantage is unfair to his peer
players or the target is one that he is not supposed
to have achieved.6
Specifically, we present a classification scheme for online
game cheating, in the expectation that by categorizing various
online game cheats, our understanding of this phenomenon
will be increased, useful patterns and conclusions can be
established, and it will be possible to provide improved
protection for online game systems against cheating using this
knowledge. Our classification is intentionally reminiscent of
the dependability taxonomy provided in [13].
A. Related Work
Several authors have attempted to define a framework
for classifying and understanding online game cheating. For
example, Davis [8] categorized traditional forms of casino
cheating and discussed their potential counterparts in online
games. However, a casino is not representative enough to
reflect all forms of online game settings, in which cheating
may occur with differing characteristics.
Pritchard [26] reported many real cases of online cheating
that have occurred in various games, and classified them into
a framework of six categories. However, his classification is
ad hoc and not comprehensive. Indeed, a lot of online cheats
do not readily fit into any of his categories.
Yan et al [35] reported a more thorough effort identifying
eleven common cheating forms in online games. In addition,
Yan [36] examined the cheating techniques that have occurred
or might occur in online contract bridge communities, and
organized them into a simple framework.
There is also a large amount of literature investigating the
definition of taxonomies for security vulnerabilities, attacks or
6At present the preponderance of cheating in online games is carried out
by male game players, so for linguistic convenience in the rest of this paper
we will appear to imply that all cheaters are male.
5intrusions in a general setting. For example, Landwehr et al
constructed a classification of security flaws in software with
respect to genesis (how did the flaw enter the system?), time
of introduction (when did it enter the system?) and location
(where in the system is it manifested?) [12]. Krsul conducted
his PhD research on software vulnerability analysis and tax-
onomy construction [11]. Neumann et al gave a taxonomy of
attacks with respect to the technique used to launch each given
attack [22]. The MAFTIA project [6] proposed a taxonomy
for intrusion detection systems and attacks. Lindqvist and
Jonsson [14] conducted a brief but useful survey on the desired
properties of a taxonomy, and defined a taxonomy of intrusions
with respect to intrusion techniques and results. All these
studies are relevant to our aims. In online games, a player
might cheat by exploiting a “vulnerability”, or by launching
an “attack” or “intrusion”. However, as will be discussed later,
online game cheating also has some unique manifestations.
B. Common Cheating Forms
Before defining our taxonomy, we identify all cheating
forms known to us, as they have occurred or might occur in
online games.
Eleven common cheating forms were identified in [35].
However, we have seen the need of refining the framework
given in [35] and now present a revised listing, which clas-
sifies cheats into 15 categories. Those that are new, or are
significantly revised versions of the categories listed in [35],
are marked with asterisks.
A:* Cheating due to Misplaced Trust. Much cheating in-
volves modifying game code, data, or both on the client
side. A cheater can modify his game client program,
configuration data, or both, and then replace the old
copy with the revised one for future use. Alternatively,
the modification or replacement of code and data can be
done on the fly.
This form of cheating is really due to misplaced trust.
Too much trust is placed on the client side, which in
reality cannot be trusted at all because a cheating player
can have the total control over his game client. Coun-
termeasures based on security by obscurity approaches
such as program obfuscation will eventually fail in the
fight against this form of cheating, because they try to
protect the wrong thing.
B: Cheating by Collusion. Players collude to gain unfair
advantages. Representative cases, including various col-
lusive cheats in online contract bridge communities and
the “win trading” collusion in the WarCraft game, were
discussed in detail in [36].
C:* Cheating by Abusing Game Procedure.
This form of cheating may be carried out without any
technical sophistication, and a cheater simply abuses the
operating procedure of a game. One common case is
escaping: a cheater disconnects himself from the game
system when he is going to lose [35], [36].
Another example is scoring cheating [35] in online
Go games, which abuses the scoring procedure as fol-
lows. When a game is finished, “dead” stones must
be identified and then removed by hand before the
system can determine which side wins this game. During
this scoring process, however, a cheating player may
stealthily remove “alive” stones of his opponent, and
then “overturn” the game result. (When the size of
territory occupied by each side is close, this cheating
may easily escape the awareness of the cheated player,
especially when he is not a strong player.)
D: Cheating Related to Virtual Assets Virtual characters
and items acquired in online games can be traded for real
money. Lots of cheating related to these virtual assets
can then occur.
E:* Cheating due to Machine Intelligence. Artificial intel-
ligence techniques can also be exploited by a cheating
player in some online games. For example, the advance-
ment of computer chess research has produced many
programs that can compete with human players at the
master level. When playing chess online, a cheater can
always look for the best candidates for his next move
by running a strong computer chess program.
This is in fact cheating due to the superiority, in this
particular situation, of machine intelligence over that of
an ordinary human being. It can happen in many other
online games, depending on two factors: 1) the proper-
ties of the game: whether the game can be modeled as a
computable problem, and 2) the maturity of AI research
into such games. For example, online Go players do not
worry about this form of cheating, since the state of the
art of AI research can produce only very weak computer
Go programs – the strongest one at present can be easily
beaten by an amateur human player [18].
F:* Cheating via the Graphics Driver. By modifying the
graphics driver installed in his operating system, a cheat-
ing player can, for example, make a wall transparent in
some online games so that he can see through the wall
and locate other players who are supposed to be hidden
behind the wall [4].
G: Cheating by Denying Service to Peer Players. A
cheating player gains advantages by denying service to
his peer players. For example, a cheater can delay the
responses from one opponent in a real-time game by
flooding his network connection. Other peer players will
then be cheated into believing that there is something
wrong with the network connection of the victim, and
agree to kick him out from the game in order to avoid
the game session being stalled.
H:* Timing Cheating. In some real-time online games,
a cheating player can delay his own move until he
knows all the opponents’ moves, and thus gain a huge
advantage [7]. This look-ahead cheat is one kind of
timing cheating.
Other timing cheating includes the suppress-correct
cheat, which allows a cheater to gain an advantage by
purposefully dropping update messages at the “right”
time [7].
I: Cheating by Compromising Passwords. A password
is often the key to much of or all the data and autho-
rization that a player has in an online game system. By
6compromising a password, a cheater can have access
to the data and authorization that the victim has in the
game system.
J: Cheating due to Lack of Secrecy. When communica-
tion packets are exchanged in plain text format, one can
cheat by eavesdropping on packets and inserting, delet-
ing or modifying game events or commands transmitted
over the network.
K: Cheating due to Lack of Authentication. If there is
no proper mechanism for authenticating a game server
to clients, a cheater can collect many ID-password
pairs of legitimate players by setting up a bogus game
server. Similarly, if there is not a proper mechanism
authenticating a client, a cheater can also exploit this
to gain advantages. For example, it is critical to re-
authenticate a player before any password change is
executed for him. Otherwise, when a player leaves his
computer temporarily unattended and his game session
unclosed – in countries such as China and Korea, many
people play online games in internet cafes – a cheater
who can physically access the player’s machine may
stealthily change his password, and exploit the changed
password afterwards.
L:* Cheating by Exploiting a Bug or Loophole. This
form of cheating exploits a bug or loophole in game
programs or the game design itself, without involving
any modification of game code or data. Once discovered,
such a bug/loophole will give knowledgeable players a
major advantage. An early case of such cheating can be
traced back to an incident, that occurred in Lucasfilm’s
Habitat, one of the first multi-user virtual environments.
Due to an inadvertent pricing error, people in the game
could sell virtual items to a pawn shop at a higher price
than they paid to get them from a vending machine. By
shuttling back and forth between the vending machine
and the pawn shop, some players become millionaires
overnight [5].
If a player has to modify the game program or data in
order to exploit a bug or design loophole to gain unfair
advantages, according to our definition, his cheating
behaviour will not be covered by this form, but by
cheating due to misplaced trust or the following form
of cheating by compromising game servers.
M:* Cheating by Compromising Game Servers. A cheater
can tamper with game server programs or change their
configuration once he has obtained access to the game
host systems.
N: Cheating Related to Internal Misuse. A game operator
usually has the privileges of a system administrator. It is
easy for an insider – an employee of the game operator
– to abuse this privilege. For example, he can generate
super characters by modifying the game database on the
server side.
O: Cheating by Social Engineering. Often cheaters at-
tempt to trick a player into believing something attrac-
tive or annoying has happened to him and that as a result
his ID and password are needed.
1) Nature of Cheats: Atomic vs. Non-Atomic: The list
given above attempts to be comprehensive but not necessarily
disjoint. Therefore, a given cheat might fall into more than one
category. It would be ideal to define a list of common cheating
forms that is disjoint, but unfortunately this has proved to be
a very challenging task.
Although each listed form can be an independent cheat, an
actual case of cheating may be complex and involves multiple
forms of cheating. For example, the Pogo cheat discussed
in [36] involved two dishonest players who collusively abused
a voting protocol to gain advantages. It is in fact a cheat due to
collusion, which abuses the game procedure, and at the same
time also exploits a loophole in the game system design.
Another example is the hit-then-run cheat [35] in Internet
Go games, which can occur as follows.
Go is a time-critical game played between two people. The
Go server counts the time spent by each player in a game,
and the player who runs out of time will automatically lose
the game. Many online players choose to play 25 moves in 10
minutes or less, and it is usual for one to play 5 stones in the
last 10 seconds. Therefore, a cheating player can easily defeat
an opponent by timing him out with a well timed flooding
attack. This is a form of cheating by denying service to peer
players.
The above timeout cheat can be used together with cheating
by abusing the game procedure. Some Internet Go services
implemented a penalty rule to fight against the escaping cheat:
players who disconnect themselves will lose their unfinished
game unless they return to finish it within a limited period.
A hit-then-run cheater can take advantage of this rule in the
following way. He floods one opponent so that the game is
recorded as disconnected by the opponent. Then he does not
log on until the penalty period has passed. The game cannot
be finished in time, and the opponent will automatically lose
points for it.
2) Generic vs. Specific Cheats: Table I classifies all the
above fifteen cheating forms into two divisions. The “generic”
division includes seven forms of common cheating in online
games, which are also generic to all network applications but
may appear with different names such as “attacks” or “intru-
sions” in different contexts. The “specific” division includes
both cheating specific to online games, and cheating that may
also occur with different names in other network applications
but has some interesting features or implications in the context
of online games.
In fact, some cheating forms even appear to be unique to
specific game genres. For example, cheating due to machine
intelligence would seem to be unique to online versions of
the traditional board or card games, and cheating related to
virtual assets has occurred only in multiplayer role-playing
games. This can be explained by the unique characteristics of
such game genres.
C. A Taxonomy of Online Cheating
In this section, we define a taxonomy for online game cheat-
ing. This is a three dimensional taxonomy, and online cheating
is classified by the underlying cause (what is exploited?), the
7Type Label Cheating Form
A Cheating due to Misplaced Trust
B Cheating by Collusion
C Cheating by Abusing Game Procedure
D Cheating Related to Virtual Assets
Specific to online games E Cheating due to Machine Intelligence
F Cheating via the Graphics Driver
G Cheating by Denying Service to Peer Players
H Timing Cheating
I Cheating by Compromising Passwords
J Cheating due to Lack of Secrecy
K Cheating due to Lack of Authentication
Generic L Cheating by Exploiting a Bug or Design Loophole
M Cheating by Compromising Game Servers
N Cheating Related to Internal Misuse
O Cheating by Social Engineering
TABLE I
COMMON CHEATING FORMS IN ONLINE GAMES
Cheating due to Misplaced Trust
Cheating due to Lack of Secrecy
System In the Game Cheating due to Lack of Authentication
Design System Timing Cheating
Inadequacy Cheating by Exploiting a Bug or Design Loophole
Cheating by Denying Service to Peer Players
In the Underlying Cheating via the Graphics Driver
Systems Cheating by Compromising Game Servers
Cheating by Denying Service to Peer Players
Cheating by Collusion
Cheating Related to Internal Misuse
Operational Cheating by Abusing Game Procedure
Failure Cheating by Compromising Passwords
Cheating by Social Engineering
Cheating due to Machine Intelligence
Cheating Related to Virtual Assets
TABLE II
ONLINE GAME CHEATING TAXONOMY: BY CAUSE
cheating consequence (what type of security failure can be
caused?) and the cheating principal (who can cheat?).
Tables II – IV shows the details of the taxonomy by cause,
consequence and cheating principal, respectively. Note that the
same cheating form will appear at least once in each of these
categories. Divisions and, where appropriate, subdivisions are
provided within the categories; these and their motivations are
described in detail later.
1) By Cause: Online cheating may or may not exploit sys-
tem design inadequacies. For example, cheating by exploiting
a bug or loophole exploits inadequacies in the game design,
implementation or both. However, social engineering does
not involve exploitation of any technical design inadequacies.
Therefore, we classify the causes of online cheating to two di-
visions: system design inadequacy which concerns a technical
design failure arising in the process of system development,
and operational failure, which is largely due to a failure of
human-computer interaction during the operational phase of
a game system. (Some operational failures can be ultimately
a design failure: they arise due to “the inability to foresee
all the situations of the system will be faced with during its
operational life, or the refusal to consider some of them” [13]
for reasons such as a concern for time-to-market.)
There are two subdivisions in system design inadequacy:
inadequacy in the game system and inadequacy in the under-
lying systems. Online games are applications running on top
of an underlying networking and operating system. A cheater
can exploit a flaw in a game system, a flaw in its underlying
networking or operating system, or both.
Cheating due to misplaced trust, lack of secrecy or authenti-
cation, timing cheating, cheating by exploiting a bug or design
loophole exploit technical inadequacies in the game system,
and they belong to the first subdivision.
Two common cheating forms, namely cheating via the
graphics driver and cheating by compromising game servers,
belong to the second subdivision. Specifically, the first cheat-
ing form occurs on the game client side. However, rather
than exploit the game system itself, it modifies a system
driver that is part of the operating system. Similarly, a cheater
compromising a game server usually breaks into the server by
exploiting an operating system or network flaw on the server
side7.
In addition, cheating by denying service to peer players usu-
ally exploits some inherent weakness of the network layer, but
7A game server program may have flaws that can be remotely exploited by
a cheater, but we have not yet seen such cases in real life.
8it can also be committed by exploiting a design inadequacy in
the game system alone. For example, a cheat that occurred in
the Firestorm game [13] exploited a buffer-overflow condition
in the game program to disconnect all players. Therefore, this
form of cheating is included in both subdivisions.
A lot of cheating techniques in online games, such as
collusion, social engineering, game procedural abuse, pass-
word compromising, cheating related to internal misuse or
virtual assets, are only weakly related to any technical design
inadequacy. Instead, they largely exploit “the human side”
of computer security [25]. Therefore, they are classified as
operational failures.
2) By Consequence: We largely base our classification
of cheating consequences on the four traditional aspects of
computer security: confidentiality (prevention of unauthorized
disclosure of information), integrity (prevention of unautho-
rized modification of information), availability (prevention of
unauthorized withholding of information) and authenticity (the
ability to assure the identity of a remote user regardless of
the user’s host). A breach of confidentiality results in theft of
information or possessions, a breach of integrity results in code
or data modification, a breach of availability results in service
denial and a breach of authenticity results in a masquerade.
Cheating by collusion, compromising passwords or social
engineering, or cheating due to lack of secrecy result in the
theft of information or possessions in a game. Cheating due
to lack of authentication results in a masquerade. Cheating
by denying service to peer players involves selective service
denials, but cheating by compromising game servers, due to
misplaced trust, or related to internal misuse usually involve
integrity failure.
However, these traditional aspects of computer security are
insufficient to cover all the consequences of online game
cheating. For example, the cheat exploiting the erroneous
pricing in Habitat violated none of the issues of confidentiality,
availability, integrity or authenticity. And the list goes on.
We introduce “fairness” between peer players as an ad-
ditional aspect for understanding online game cheating, and
a breach of fairness results in a fairness violation. Either
cheating by abusing game procedure, timing cheating, cheat-
ing by exploiting a bug or design loophole, or cheating due
to machine intelligence can result in a fairness violation.
Although cheating related to virtual assets may result in theft
of possessions, it is hardly the result of confidentiality failure.
Therefore, cheating related to virtual assets is also categorized
as a fairness violation.
3) By Cheating Principal: A player can cheat indepen-
dently either in single player or multi-player online games,
whereas in multi-player games two or more players can cheat
via malicious cooperation. Furthermore, a player can also
collude with an insider to cheat. The identity of the cheating
principal is used as the third dimension in our classifications,
and it provides a way of distinguishing cooperative cheats from
their independent counterparts.
Regarding the cheating principal, there are three divisions:
by player, by game operator and by operator-player (i.e. the
cooperation of player and game operator).
The by operator-player division accommodates cheating
committed through the cooperation of a player and an insider,
which typically involves collusion as well as internal misuse
that are specific to the game.
The by game operator division accommodates cheating
related to internal misuse, where no collusion between player
and insider is involved, however. One example is that of an
insider who is also a player. As discussed in [36], house
cheating orchestrated by a game operator alone is likely to
occur. However, it is beyond the scope of our online cheating
definition used in this paper.
There are two subdivisions in the cheating by player cat-
egory, namely by single player or by multiple players. Col-
lusion between players is covered by the second subdivision,
whereas, as indicated in Table IV, 13 other cheating forms
belong to the first subdivision.
D. Discussion
Our taxonomy brings out a systematic view of online
cheating, from which a number of observations can be made.
First, it is interesting to examine the distribution of each
common cheating form in the two orthogonal dimensions of
causes and consequences.
Table V constructs such a distribution matrix, where the
cheating cause and consequence are displayed in rows and
columns respectively, and cheating forms in the cells are
represented with their labels assigned in Section 3. The matrix
in Table V shows that most types of online game cheats have
been about information theft, code or data modification, or
fairness violation, and they largely exploit either operational
failures or flaws in the game systems.
However, the distribution of cheating forms in the cause-
consequence matrix may not remain stationary as online
games and the cheating phenomenon co-evolve. Therefore,
any observation based exclusively on this matrix may have to
remain tentative. For example, it is not yet clear whether cheats
exploiting flaws in the underlying networking and operating
systems will increase in the future.
It is also interesting to note that as a result of taxonomic
analysis using Table V, we have corrected a mistake in a
previous version of this paper. Namely, we found that we
carelessly missed a type of cheating by denying service to peer
players, which involves exploitation of design inadequacies in
the game system only.
It appears that we can also use this table to suggest novel
additional forms of cheating that will likely occur in the future
while arguing why some blank squares in the table are and
whether they will remain empty. For example, it appears that
cheating leading to service denial due to operational failure
will never occur, since seemingly there is no other way to deny
service to peer players other than by exploiting technical de-
sign inadequacies in the game system, the underlying systems,
or both. However, it is very likely that cheats which lead to
masquerade, information theft or fairness violation and which
are due to design inadequacies in the underlying systems, will
occur in the future, although it is not yet clear in which forms
they will manifest themselves.
Second, as the classification by cheating principal in Ta-
ble IV shows, the majority of current game cheating can be
9Cheating by Collusion
Theft of Information Cheating by Compromising Passwords
or Possessions Cheating due to Lack of Secrecy
Cheating by Social Engineering
Service Denial Cheating by Denying Service to Peer Players
Cheating due to Misplaced Trust
Code or Data Cheating via the Graphics Driver
Modification Cheating by Compromising Game Servers
Cheating Related to Internal Misuse
Masquerade Cheating due to Lack of Authentication
Cheating by Abusing Game Procedure
Timing Cheating
Fairness Violation Cheating by Exploiting a Bug or Design Loophole
Cheating Related to Virtual Assets
Cheating due to Machine Intelligence
TABLE III
ONLINE GAME CHEATING TAXONOMY: BY CONSEQUENCE
Cheating due to Misplaced Trust
Cheating by Abusing Game Procedure
Cheating Related to Virtual Assets
Cheating by Compromising Passwords
Cheating by Denying Service to Peer Players
Single Player Cheating due to Lack of Secrecy
Player Cheating due to Lack of Authentication
Timing Cheating
Cheating by Exploiting a Bug or Design Loophole
Cheating by Compromising Game Servers
Cheating by Social Engineering
Cheating due to Machine Intelligence
Cheating via the Graphics Driver
Multiple Players Cheating by Collusion
Game Operator Cheating Related to Internal Misuse (No collusion involved)
Operator-Player Cheating Related to Internal Misuse (Collusion involved)
TABLE IV
ONLINE GAME CHEATING TAXONOMY: BY CHEATING PRINCIPAL
Info Theft Service Code or Data Masquerade Fairness
Denial Modification Violation
Design inadequacy in J G A K E, H, L
the game system
Design inadequacy in G F, M
the underlying systems
Operational failure B, I, O N C, D
TABLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF CHEATING FORMS IN THE CAUSE-CONSEQUENCE MATRIX
committed by a single player independently, although some
others involve collusion between one and his peer player(s) or
an insider. However, for similar reasons to those given above,
this observation also remains tentative.
Third, re-examining the taxonomy by consequence in Ta-
ble III, in fact, no matter whether a cheating form results in
either information theft, service denial, code or data modi-
fication, or masquerade, a fairness violation is caused and
it gains a cheater some advantages over his peer players in
the game. Therefore, the perspective of fairness appears to
be essential in understanding security in applications such as
online games. This echoes the result of [36] and can be easily
explained as follows. On the one hand, fair play is essential
to any game. Online gaming is not an exception, and fairness
should be an inherent concern in its design. On the other hand,
online players usually do not know each other, and they are
often scattered across different physical locations. Therefore,
the social structures preventing cheating in the non-electronic
world are no longer in place for online games. It is security
that can help provide an alternative mechanism for fairness
enforcement.
Nonetheless, some game cheating problems cannot be
solved by security techniques alone. For example, security
mechanisms that usually can mitigate collusion in one way
or another do not work well in the setting of online Bridge, in
which collusive players can illicitly exchange card informa-
tion via out-of-band channels such as telephone and instant
messengers. Instead, a collusion detection approach based on
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artificial intelligence techniques appears to be essential in
mitigating this devastating threat in online bridge commu-
nities [36]. Therefore, security plays an important but non-
exclusive role in enforcing the fair play in online games.
V. CONCLUSION
Just as in other content-critical industries such as music or
video, security was simply not an issue in the early years
of computer games. Later on, security became an important
technique for copy protection, and it still plays this role
in some game market segments. However, we have found
that much security effort of console game vendors has been
directed towards locking in their customers to their hardware,
and making strategic plays in the market.
The emergence of online games has led to fundamentally
changed security requirements, and an important new security
concern is online cheating. To understand cheating in online
games, we have developed a taxonomy for it, in which the
classification is made with respect to the underlying causes,
consequences and the cheating principals. We have found that
traditional aspects of computer security such as confidentiality,
integrity, availability and authenticity are insufficient to explain
cheating in online games. Fairness is a vital additional aspect,
and the problem of its enforcement provides a convincing
perspective for understanding the role of security techniques
in online games.
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